In his report to the President this summer, Gen. McChrystal stated that he thought the war in Afghanistan was winnable, but if things did not change quickly, it would be lost. McChrystal has now been handed nearly 100,000 American troops, along with thousands more NATO and Afghan partners, and given about a year to show that his counterinsurgency/kill-capture strategy is bringing stability and progress to the conflict. McChrystal is a sober man, but he is optimistic of our chances to turn things around. Here is a money quote from the General:

“The biggest thing is in convincing the Afghan people. This is all a war of perceptions. This is not a physical war in terms of how many people you kill or how much ground you capture, how many bridges you blow up. This is all in the minds of the participants.”

He certainly isn’t your grandfather’s General!

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My original plan for today’s post was to be on how the US may be over-relying on drone attacks against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but then I read this Michael Phillips’ piece. But first the drones.

The drone attacks have indeed proved effective in eliminating several high level Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders. These men, with the latest possibly being Pakistani Taliban leader Hakimullah Mehsud, are dangerous, irreconcilable enemies who we all are left better on without. The Obama administration is obviously a big supporter of use of the drones in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It has been widely reported that the Obama administration has probably at least doubled (getting accurate numbers on what is a ’secret’ process is difficult) the number of unmanned drone attacks since 2008. One report states that there have been around 30 drone missile attacks killing over 200 people since last September. The Obama administration’s just released budget contains a 75% increase in drone funding, which JCS Chairman Mike Mullen asserts will nearly double the number of Reaper and Predator orbits.  Obama himself bragged about their increasing use, compared to 2008 (hint, I use them of more than Bush did).

As much as I’ve been a supporter of this method, I’m starting to be a bit concerned that the US may be becoming too reliant on what is despite its technologically impressive nature, a blunt instrument of war. Just the other day, it is believed 4 separate, but obviously connected drone strikes occurred in North Waziristan, reportedly killing 29 people. While I hope and am fairly certain, most of these victims were Al Qaeda or Taliban insurgent leaders, this one attack had to have had some costs as well. It is likely that some of those killed were civilians, which of course breeds anger and resentment from the local population. News of a large scale attack like this also is likely to pour even more fire in a country that is already growing tired of American interference. Lastly, even me, one who believes that the Taliban and Al Qaeda can’t just keep replacing dead/captured leaders, is starting to grow a bit skeptical on exactly how far back these assassinations are negatively impacting our adversaries in Central Asia. Hakimullah Mehsud just recently took the place of Baitullah Mehsud, and even if Hakimullah is infact a ‘goner’, how much will this set back the Taliban’s ability to create chaos in Pakistan and hold control over vast parts of Afghanistan? This question is extremely difficult to answer, but very important.

I also couldn’t help but connect Obama’s drone attack emphasis with his administration’s interrogation and Gitmo policies. To be blunt, it started to appear to me that this administration would rather just kill these perpetrators than have to deal with the mess of capturing, interrogating, prosecuting, and finally confining them. Back to the Phillips’ piece now….finally!

This amazing work of journalism showcases a much more nuanced, yet aggressive tactical strategy against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Phillips was embedded with a group of Special Forces, accompanied with Afghan Army personnel, in Afghanistan’s Zabul Province. He provides in-depth detail on how the US troops and Afghan army members attempt to find specific insurgent leaders by both getting close to local population (Barghantu village in this case) and aggressively combating the enemy with force if necessary. The piece ends with American medics desperately fighting to keep a professed Taliban fighter alive (using donated blood from US soldiers) just hours after their countrymen put the bullets in him. Though it wasn’t exactly said in the article (besides the usual COIN/protect the population lines from Petraeus and McChrystal early on), it was known that this special ops team wanted to learn more about the enemy, not just ‘kill’em off’. Combine this with the announced assault on Marjah in Helmand Province by top US/NATO military brass and one cannot just label the Obama administration’s Afghan strategy as too one-sided or parochial.

I hoped this made at least a little bit of sense.

(Photo Source: CNN)

I apologize for my absence as I’ve been in the middle of an apartment move that made me wish I was literally in a ‘graveyard of empires’. But now I’m nearly settled, the internet now is internetting effectively, and we can get back to all things Afghanistan shortly.

During the past week of moving mayhem, I did acquire the book ‘The Only Thing Worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets Forged a New Afghanistan‘ by Eric Blehm, who was part of the Green Beret team that helped unseat the Taliban in 2001. Blehm has been all over the news and I look forward to reading the book and reviewing it for all you. Here is the book’s release statement:

Eight years and over 900 fallen American soldiers later, the war in Afghanistan rages on. Until now, the American public has had scant opportunity to understand either the reality on the ground or the people fighting this war. With the release of The Only Thing Worth Dying For, readers will finally get a look into the secret world of Special Forces soldiers operating in the thick of Taliban country just weeks after the terror strikes on 9/11.

And here’s a short video by Blehm:

In addition, since I’ve been absent, the parliamentary elections have been pushed back until early fall, US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry’s memo to President Obama advising against a troop surge was leaked, President Karzai offered up a comprehensive plan to bring low to high level members of the Taliban in from the cold (or should we say, hills), and a major conference regarding the present and future of the country was held in London. I’ll try to touch on each of these as they evolve in the next few days and weeks. Until then I recommend checking out these two pieces:

- Peter Feaver’s analysis of the Eikenberry memo, which focuses on both its political and policy impacts.

- Ahmed Rashid, who knows the Taliban well, gives his view (he’s strongly in favor) of opening up a reconciliation program for the Taliban insurgents.

Yesterday’s attack in Kabul by a team of 7 Taliban members once again highlights the fragility of the Afghan government and state. Though only 5 non-insurgents were killed, 3 Afghan soldiers and 2 civilians, the militants were able to disrupt hundreds of Kabul citizens’ lives and threaten the safety of President Karzai and members of his cabinet for over 4 hours.

The attack had a Mumbai massacre feel to it, but it appears that the Taliban fighters were more precise with their targets, as one present Afghan civilian stated “If they wanted to, they could have killed everyone.” For instance, though two of the attackers entered a mall full of vulnerable shoppers, the militants let most leave the premise safely. It appears that the US-backed Afghan state was the real target, especially President Karzai, Central Bank, and Ministry of Justice. Also possible, is that this Taliban mission could show a more concerted effort by the insurgent group to avoid civilian casualties as they can be deemed counter productive.

New York Times reporter Dexter Filkins has done an excellent job following this story. This incredible video of one of the explosions that occurred helps show the intensity of the attack:

FPA has a new China blogger that I highly recommend checking out. His name is Henry Hoyle and he wrote this great piece on the numerous implications of China’s Aynak investment in Afghanistan. Here it is in full below:

China’s Afghan Investment: Brilliant Strategy or Expensive Gamble?

The December 31^st NYT had a great in-depth article on the US$2.9 billion Chinese investment in the Aynak mine in Afghanistan. While China’s Aynak investment is not a new story, it is certainly a fascinating case study in China’s bold mode of foreign engagement.

With this deal to extract the enormously rich copper reserves in Aynak, and build the huge infrastructure necessary to do so (apparently even promising to build mosques), Beijing has, in a “single move,”

strengthened its hold on a vital resource, engineered the single largest investment in Afghan history, promised to create thousands of new Afghan jobs and established itself as the Afghan government’s pre-eminent business partner and single largest source of tax payments.

And of course, the commercial and geopolitical benefits of this win-win-win-win all accrue to China thanks to the (relative) security offered by the U.S. military. All in all, the project is billed as an example of

how China’s leaders, flush with money and in control of both the government and major industries, meld strategy, business and statecraft into a seamless whole.

The jury is out on how successful this “melding” has been, in Afghanistan or elsewhere, and if such melding is a smart idea in the first place. The viability of the Aynak investment and other Chinese strategic ventures in risky countries, whether assessed on geopolitical, diplomatic, or commercial terms, will come into focus only over the course of this new decade. That said, I think China’s Afghanistan foray already does not bode well for Beijing’s insight.

First, it seems China’s leaders seriously miscalculated in predicting the security situation in Afghanistan. China signed the Aynak deal in late 2007, when Afghanistan was relatively peaceful but signs of renewed violence were already evident. They were awarded project in part because of their willingness to commence the project under politically unstable circumstances. To what extent did Beijing allow for the increase in violence and instability that has come to pass?

Even if one argues China is taking the long view and establishing a “strategic beachhead” in Afghanistan, it is difficult to believe Beijing did not anticipate the prospects for the country’s medium-term stability would get so bad so quickly. The marked deterioration in security since when the deal was signed has significantly affected the project’s progress, now a year to 18 months behind schedule.

Second, the economics of Aynak and other such deals may be good for government shareholders but they are not necessarily good for China. The nearly unlimited money implicitly pledged by the government to underwrite these risky foreign projects, which makes them viable in the first place, comes from various government policies that indirectly transfer wealth from Chinese households to state-owned corporations. The Beijing leadership as a result has way more money at its fingertips than it knows what to do with. Thus significantly distorts their economic calculus, making feasible otherwise impractical adventures. I think many Chinese economists would argue that investment projects like Aynak, for all the resources accumulated, come at enormous but hidden domestic costs.

China’s overseas resource spree then is not some brilliant strategic ploy formulated in a vacuum. It is heavily influenced by the need for a non-wasteful outlet for the vast stores of cash that has piled up in the Communist Party’s coffers due to massive imbalances in the Chinese economy. It is unfortunate then that these resources, obtained at great expense, will then only exacerbate distortions in China’s economy. China’s economic model is heavily imbalanced in favor of fixed-asset investment and rife with manufacturing overcapacity. Paying a premium to secure cheap resources well into the future will not help China make its much-needed transition towards a services and consumption economy.

In the end, making too much of Chinese state company’s “melding…of strategy, business and statecraft” exaggerates Beijing’s decision-making prowess and agency. Chinese state-owned corporations have enormous influence over policy-making in China, and regularly abuse their power in pursuit of profits. Remember, for every green energy industrial policy, there is a North-South Waterway or some other exorbitantly wasteful or misbegotten project. And while melding business and geopolitics can be good strategy in some situations, it can also create more problems than it solves. Take for example the U.S. strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia or other Middle Eastern petrol states; in exchange for a stable supply of oil, the U.S. supported brutal regimes, fueled Islamic terrorism and became addicted to cheap oil. What will projects like Aynak cost to China in the long run?

Good news for President Karzai, the Afghan army, and US/NATO fighting forces in Afghanistan can be found in a poll commissioned by the BBC, ABC News and Germany’s ARD. 1500 Afghans from 34 provinces showed a surprising 70% affirmative that their country was headed in the right direction, a full 40% jump from last year. 68% of those polled are in favor of the American troop presence, an increase of a 5 from a year ago, and an overall promising sign. Reelected President Karzai can smile from the polls results as 72% of the Afghans rated him as excellent or good, with only 10% choosing ‘poor’.

Also a good sign for all involved except for the group mentioned was the results showing only 6% favored a Taliban controlled government. The Taliban were also widely accused of being the reason behind all of the violence in the country. Polls are polls and inherently flawed and when performed in unstable, violence-threatened environment, but these results do show signs of resiliency, if not light.

Though it has yet to be confirmed, it appears Swedish diplomat Staffan di Mistura will replace Kai Eide as the top UN official in Afghanistan. Mistura has recently worked for the UN’s World Food Programme and as an official in Iraq. He served as director of fundraising and external relations for the U.N.’s office in Afghanistan from 1988 to 1991 and seems to have the approval of the Obama administration, as American envoy Richard Holbrooke was quoted “Di Mistura has the unanimous support of the U.S. government.”

Di Mistura will have quite the task ahead of him. His most important duty will be in maintaining a productive relation with both the Karzai government and the US government. Eide ran into various problems in this regard, culminating in claims that he was too friendly with Karzai, undermining views that the presidential election was illegitimate. UN official positions in conflict zones is always a precarious endeavor, let us hope Di Mistura is up to the task.

ForeignPolicy.com has a fantastic slideshow of Afghanistan: 2009. I recommend checking out the entire collection, but here are some of my favorites:

All these dramatic photos are amazing, but this one I found earlier this year is still my favorite:

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A former intelligence official called it a “high-level asset meeting gone bad.” Bad is definitely an understatement. Of course the comment is in reference to the suicide attack which killed 7 CIA agents at Forward Operating Base Chapman in border province of Khost. They were “experienced frontline officers and their knowledge and expertise will be sorely missed,” said Henry A. Crumpton, who led the CIA campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. The attacker was a potential informant of the Haqqani network of the Taliban and was wearing an Afghan National Army uniform at the time of the attack. Apparently, the perpetrator made it through one checkpoint and blew himself and several others away before he was to be searched for weapons. The Pakistani and Afghan Taliban have both claimed responsibility for the attack, with one specific Taliban leader stating that the attack was in revenge for CIA-led drone attacks.

This tragic incident highlights numerous issues challenging the US/NATO presence in Afghanistan. First off, it is indeed the nature of the covert intelligence game that one has to trust those who you really cannot trust. The CIA in Afghanistan need to gather information on Al Qaeda and the Taliban leadership and organization and to do this human intelligence is a vital component. After all, the drones don’t just know where the bad guys are hiding by themselves.

This specific incident, which involved a supposed Afghan Army member, also portrays the difficulties in discerning friend from foe. How serious is this issue to the Obama administration’s Afghan strategy? Vital would be an understatement. Key to future stability of Afghanistan, and to a lessening of a foreign military presence, is the growth in size and capability of the Afghan army and police. The Taliban of course know this and will do whatever they can to undermine its progress. A great way to do this is to infiltrate the Afghan army and police ranks with your own soldiers and inflict demoralizing and strategic calamities, such as this Chapman CIA incident and the shooting of five British soldiers by an Afghan police officer last month. Throw in the fact that the Afghan government, and its foreign purse holders, are desperate to build up the Army and police numbers and it should not surprise us that some ‘bad apples’ are mixed into the bunch. If I were the Taliban, this is what I would do.

Nevertheless, in terms of the CIA’s presence in Afghanistan, it is still critical to have an on the ground footprint in Afghanistan’s most volatile southeastern regions. The drone attacks have had a major impact on downgrading the Taliban and Al Qaeda’s leadership and the pressure must be maintained. This likely cannot happen if the CIA has to move out of Khost, Kandahar, etc. It has been reported that the CIA presence in Afghanistan is to increase by about 20-25% along with the surge in US/NATO troops this coming year, but one can bet that this Chapman attack will change some of the calculus on how the agency operates.

Tis the season for giving….and contributing to victory in Afghanistan?! Thanks to groups like Spirit of America we all have the opportunity to do both. Jim Hake, Spirit of America’s founder, implores all ‘ordinary’ citizens to help our soldiers in Afghanistan by helping the Afghan people. His group and many others have donated tons of clothes, school supplies, blankets, etc. to needy Afghan villagers. Besides providing needed resources for thousands of Afghans, it is hoped that this show of generosity will lead to a greater trust between American/NATO members and the local population. After all, the US has decided to push for COIN ‘protect the citizens first’ strategy. While the strategic effects of such donations will always be difficult to measure, it sure sounds like the right thing to do to me.

Here is Spirit of America’s website:

And another group that is aiding Afghan children:

Operation International Children

And here are a couple organizations that aid American soldiers stationed in Afghanistan and beyond:

Soldiers’ Angels

Operation Gratitude