On Sunday, the Afghan Supreme Court ruled in favor of extending the legality of Hamid Karzi’s term as president all the way until new elections, which are set to occur in late August. This is obviously a delicate matter as the country’s young constitution states that Karzai’s legitimate rule should end in May and opposition groups, specifically the National Front, have already called the ruling ‘unacceptable’ and ‘unconstitutional’. There is also great fear that Karzai will abuse his presidential powers to help him win a second term. Ah, the life of a young, unstable democracy.

The US State Department has come out in strong support of the court’s ruling and calls for all Afghans to support it as well.

The United States strongly supports and welcomes this ruling.

We believe that continuity of government in the critical period before elections is vital and contributes to creating stability.

We urge all Afghans to support this ruling by the Supreme Court and to focus on the elections to be held on August 22, rather than continuing to question the status of their government.

The United States calls on the Government of Afghanistan, joined by its international partners, to make every effort to ensure that the conditions are created for genuinely free and fair elections that will reflect the will of the Afghan people. For its part, the United States neither supports nor opposes any legitimate candidate and will concentrate its efforts on helping to create a level playing field for all candidates.

The United States is already putting money where its mouth is by literally donating $40 million dollars toward the election.  Sec of State Hillary Clinton stated: “We do not support or oppose any candidate.  We want to ensure the elections themselves are going to have legitimacy and credibility.”

So of course I take a vacation right as Afghanistan hits the front pages around the world.  President Obama held a press conference on Friday to announce a new US strategy in Afghanistan, which included a new outlook on the reasons and goals for our presence there.  I will get into the pros and cons of Obama’s plan in the next few days, but it seems clear that his administration is ready to dig deeper into US human (4,000 more troops) and financial resources (5 year assistance packages for Af/Pak) to bring stability and end the capabilities of terrorists in Afghanistan.  This maximilist approach is also tempered by what appears to be a minimalizing of US goals for the country as Obama emphasized the ‘disrupting’ and ‘defeating’ of terrorist elements in Afghanistan/Pakistan as the central goal for the conflict and talked very little about nation building or democracy strengthening.  There is much more to this policy, including pressure on Pakistan’s military and government and a regional outlook, and I look forward to getting into them soon.  Here is the US President’s Announcement:

Part I

Part II

Congress will need to approve this strategy.  What are your first impressions of Obama’s strategy?  What is it missing?  What do you think of his professed goals and focus?

***Update: Check out FPA’s Rising Powers blog piece about a Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit on Afghanistan.  For the first time a US official attended a SCO meeting.  Peace at last?

Every day I get emailed all the press briefings from the US State Department and yesterday, I found this in my inbox:  The State Department has put up bounties of several million dollars, under the Rewards for Justice program, for three men with connections to Al Qaeda, Abu Yahya al-Libi, Baitullah Mehsud, and Sirajuddin Haqqani.  All three of these men are also strongly connected to the Taliban-led insurgency in the tribal areas, with Mehsud one of the group’s main leaders.

Abu Yahya al-Libi was only given a million dollar bounty for his capture (the other two $5 mil), was actually in custody once, but escaped from the Bagram prison, and ever since has been a featured propagandist for Al-Qaeda.  He, like the other two, is suspected to be hiding in Pakistan or Afghanistan.

Baitullah Mehsud is the senior leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban and has a bounty of $5 million dollars for his capture.  Mehsud has his hands dirty from many suspected violent, terror attacks, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the suicide bombing of Islamabad’s Marriott Hotel.  Mehsud has also stated publicly his intent to attack the United States.

Sirajuddin Haqqani is a senior leader of the Haqqani terrorist network, which was founded by his father Jalaladin Haqqani, and like Mehsud has a $5 million dollar bounty on his seizure. Haqqini has admitted to the assassination of Afghan President Karzai last April.  

These Rewards for Justice bounties are not likely to have much impact on the capture or deaths of any of these dangerous men, but I am pleased that the State Department is actively pursuing them and highlighting to the US, Afghan, Pakistan, and global public the nefarious practices of these treacherous men.  Who knows, with the world’s economy in the dumps, maybe there’ll be more people looking at that cool $5 million in a new light.  Maybe we should put Dog the Bounty Hunter on the case?  Nah.

Ugh.  That is the only word that really sums up the feelings of frustration regarding the latest report from unnamed American government officials detailing support given to the Taliban by Pakistani military intelligence officials.  The US officials, which of course were not named because this information is supposedly not to become public, stated that Pakistan’s ISI, who created and fostered the Taliban back in the day, were still providing money, military supplies and strategic planning guidance to Taliban leaders and groups despite agreeing not to.  

These American officials refer to strong electronic surveillance and trustworthy informants to back up this claim.  I do not want to pretend that this situation is just cut and dry and can easily be solved with just the complete separation of Pakistani military officials and Taliban insurgent groups, but I think it can be argued that unless some major changes occur in this relationship, the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan will never be secure or stable and the central governments of Kabul and Islamabad will continue to be under siege.  

The US has been working with the Pakistani military well before even 9/11 and has provided billions of dollars of aid and after all this time stories like this are still common.  How can the Obama administration trust Pakstani intelligence and military leaders if this is still going on?  An apparent part of Obama’s new Afghan/Pakistan policy strategy is another influx of billions in aid and though we will surely hear how the money will be closely followed and mandated, one has to question how viable and secure this can possibly be.  I think it can be assumed that already a decent amount of US donations have gone to aid either the Taliban directly or indirectly.  Of course even US aid that finds its way to building schools and other facilities and programs are constantly attacked by insurgent elements, as it has been reported that hundreds of schools, especially those for women, have been forcibly closed or burned to the ground.

I don’t mean to sound so distraught or negative, but hearing another story such as this just reminds me how much further we all have to go in this fight.

Recent US policy in Afghanistan has involved a surge of troops, drone attacks, and now even a surge in these, but what about a diplomacy and civilian surge? Well, it looks like it may be here. President Obama is supposed to approve of a long, ongoing review of Afghanistan policy in the next week and it has been reported that this review will include a major increase in civilian and State Department officials to help with reconstruction. Here is Karen DeYoung’s scoop:

Some of the proposed new civilian force in Afghanistan — diplomats, specialists from federal departments such as Agriculture and Justice, and hundreds of new “full-time, temporary” hires — would work at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, officials said. Others would be assigned to U.S. provincial reconstruction teams, or PRTs, located primarily in eastern Afghanistan, and to other efforts to build Afghan civilian capacity around the country.

It appears Bush, late in his term, signed an executive order calling for more civilian officials to embedded with Afghani PRTs, as they were in Iraq. As of right now, the PRTs in Afghanistan are dominated by the military and it is hoped these new recruits can provide valuable expertise.

DeYoung also reports that the State Department has already solicited applications for 51 new positions it expects to fill by July in Afghanistan. Overall numbers of the civilian surge are still murky, but DeYoung puts up the number of 300 as an estimate.

My greatest hope would be that officials with expertise in agriculture, the rule of law, and microeconomics could help to build a backbone to the Afghan economy and government. The aforementioned Op-Chart from yesterday stated that telecommunications and per capita income were slowing increasing in the country and it is with great hope that this influx of officials can help push things further.

The New York Times published an Op-Ed Chart detailing several key aspects of the stability and growth of both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts from 2005, 2007, and 2009.  The numbers for Iraq are looking amazingly improved, where as Afghanistan is facing smaller scale, but troubling downturns.

All the Afghan indicators are on the rise except for the public’s view of Karzai’s government, which is trending downward.  Civilian, Afghan military and police, and US/NATO troop casualties are all rising at the same time as the size of US and Afghan army increases.  In 2005, US troops were rarely being killed (1 in February) and the Afghan military was facing minimal attacks (10 killed in February), but these numbers have edged upward.  US combat deaths in February 2009 went from 1 to 15 and the Afghan army went from 10 to 75.  The civilian deaths are even more alarming with a rise from 40 to 200 during the same period.

The two favorable markers included per capita income and the number of telephone subscribers, and these were modest gains.  Per capita income went from $252 in 2005 to $400 this February and telephone subscribers rose from only 2.2 million to 7 million during the same period.

I urge you to look at these numbers.  What do they tell you?

Alright, I’m pretty sure I’ve got you confused already by the title. Let me explain. Much has been leaked that the upcoming Obama policy plan for Afghanistan will take a ‘minimalist‘ approach to the crucial, yet troubling security situation in South Asia. In other words, Obama may downplay talk and attempts to create a democratic and prosperous Afghanistan, and instead aim for the creation of a stable country that can defend against extremists and terrorist elements at home and keep them from reaching abroad, especially to American shores. Now at this moment this is no sure policy-thing, as the report has yet to be released and Obama has used heavy rhetoric and significant troop commitments to the country to possibly suggest otherwise.

However, others have already given their views of what policy the US should follow in Kabul and beyond. Many of these voices are already calling Afghanistan ‘Obama’s Vietnam’, advocating a lessening of goals, and poll numbers show a surprisingly negative view of a US military presence in the country, with about 50% believing we should start drawing down troops immediately. Some of these people raise valid and thoughtful arguments that can be quite persuasive. IR scholar and arch realist Stephen Walt lays out the realist approach to US policy in Afghanistan quite well, Here is his succinct description of US national interests in Afghanistan:

“We have only one vital national interest in Afghanistan: to prevent Afghan territory from being used as a safe haven for groups plotting attacks on American soil or on Americans abroad, as al Qaeda did prior to September 11. It might be nice to achieve some other goals too (such as economic development, better conditions for women, greater political participation, etc.), but these goals are neither vital to U.S. national security nor central to the future of freedom in the United States or elsewhere. Deep down, we don’t (or shouldn’t) care very much who governs in Afghanistan, provided they don’t let anti-American bad guys use their territory to attack us. As I recall, President Bush was even willing to let the Taliban stay in power in 2001 if they had been willing to hand us Osama and his henchmen.”

Indeed, there are many people in this country that are sympathetic to this reasoning. But there also many who would fight it vigorously. Senator John McCain and Senator Joe Lieberman, both strong advocates for the ’surge’ in Iraq, call for a similar strategy and commitment for Afghanistan. They unabashedly believe that if the US is truly committed it can ‘win’, that’s right ‘win’, in Afghanistan, and this would include helping build a strong, representative government along with defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Here’s their side:

“The war in Afghanistan can be won. Success — a stable, secure, self-governing Afghanistan that is not a terrorist sanctuary — can be achieved. Just as in Iraq, there is no shortcut to success, no clever “middle way” that allows us to achieve more by doing less. A minimalist approach in Afghanistan is a recipe not for winning smarter but for losing slowly at tremendous cost in American lives, treasure and security.”

They call on Obama to follow his campaign pledge that Afghanistan is a ”war we must win.” The tone of the McCain-Lieberman is supportive, but also concerned, as you can tell they fear Obama may go the other way. I call their approach ‘realist-liberal’ because they base their strategy on hard policies of more troops and political will, but have an end goal that Afghanistan become a pluralist, democratic state because that itself will help secure US national interests by keeping extremists marginalized. Just like in Iraq, their argument basically states that if we take a minimalist approach in Afghanistan, we will just be back again and again. This strategy is based on the belief that an open, democratic society will be more peaceful toward the US and its neighbors and through time erode extremism, all IR liberal viewpoints.

Obama’s choice will probably be a tightrope between both of these policies. His choice of language concerning the conflict will be vital. Will he pledge to be there ’til the job is done’ or will he take a more subtle approach? Americans will be listening, as the poll numbers show what they hear will be crucial, but even more important will be the fact that Afghans, Pakistanis, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban-led insurgents will be to.

Last night I led my local Foreign Policy Association’s Great Decision discussion group on the Afghanistan/Pakistan conflict.  My presentation largely stemmed from FPA’s Great Decision article written by Afghan expert and US government consultant on Afghanistan, Barnett R. Rubin, and an accompanying video debating the key issues of the conflict.

I strongly recommend getting the FPA’s Great Decisions’ briefing book featuring Rubin’s article, along with articles covering energy, Cuba, Arctic geopolitics, Egypt, and the global food crisis.  Rubin’s article covers the history of the region, regional politics and relations (including Iran), terrorist elements involved in the conflict, and concludes with policy recommendations for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.  The best aspect of Rubin’s piece is his focus on Pakistan’s insecurity, both with an Indian strategic ally in Afghanistan (therefore ‘pinching’ Islamabad) and with domestic extremism and weak governance.  In terms of Afghan policy, Rubin stresses building up the legitimacy of the Afghan state and the expansion of the Afghan army and police numbers and capabilities.  Neither of these are new ideas, but both necessary for progress in the country.

Read the article, watch the 20 minute video, and let us know what you think.

Rubin and FPA also have a useful Recommended Readings section.

Patrick French, a scholar and one with family connections in Pakistan’s Swat region, recently allowed to be ruled by Sharia law by the Paki government, argues that this is a disastrous policy.  He asserts that the Swat settlement was an appeasement of radical Taliban leaders who will continue to foment unrest and violence further and further into the Pakistan. Here is a good summary of his thoughts:

Shariah law has been imposed, allowing elderly clerics to dictate the daily lives of the Swati people. President Zardari’s foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, describes this as “a local solution to a local problem,” but the deal with the Taliban represents the most serious blow to the country’s territorial integrity since the civil war of 1971, when the land that became Bangladesh was given up. When territory is surrendered in this way, it is very difficult for the state to recover it. The central premise behind the war on terrorism was that extremist groups should not be allowed sanctuaries from which to threaten the rest of the world. In that context, the loss of Swat offers the Taliban and other extremist groups a template for the future.

The Swat deal has ramifications for US negotiations with the Afghan Taliban as the fear of Swat-like appeasement must be watched carefully.  Pakistan’s decision to make a deal with the Swat Taliban seems to have come from a position of weakness, something US military officials already have voiced that would be loathed to do.  Obama’s troop surge may indeed be deployed for the central aim of making some security breakthroughs, where the  Afghan and US government could then negotiate from a more stable, strengthened position.

French’s jarring description of the Paki-Swat deal is a fair warning of the challenges faced in dealing with the Taliban, as there is the real fear that the Taliban will not stop or be appeased, that they will keep on ‘grabbing for land and power.’

FPA’s Bilal Qureshi’s Pakistan blog discusses this issue and much more.

President Obama has officially named Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry as his choice to be the US ambassador to Afghanistan.  Eikenberry, a career military man, was the top US commander in Afghanistan until 2007.  Though some are concerned about giving such a key diplomatic spot to a military leader, I feel this is an excellent choice.  Eikenberry has had productive and cordial relations with Afghan President Karzai and knows the challenges he faces in the conflict as much as anyone could.

During his stint as the lead Commander of US forces in the country, Eikenberry was one of the first to highlight the growing challenge being brought to the counter by a resurgent Taliban and has had strong words to say about the importance of tackling Al Qaeda elements inside of Pakistan, which of course is in accord with Obama’s statements.  Eikenberry’s current position as a NATO deputy chairman could also prove useful in negotiations for more European support for the stabilization of the state, emphasis on ‘could’.

It would be wrong to not end this post with an acknowledgement of the fine work done by current US Ambassador William Wood, who has now served in a very difficult position admirably for two years.  Here is a recent Q & A with the Ambassador.