One of the greatest challenges facing the United States, its NATO allies, and the Afghan government is how to handle what is sure to be a rising prison population.  The US/NATO troop surge has been followed by more aggressive efforts to take back Taliban-dominated areas and these missions have inevitably led to an increase in arrests of insurgents.  The current Afghan prison system and US controlled detention centers (specifically Bagram Air Base) have many issues that go well beyond just capacity and the Obama administration has rightfully begun to look at an overhaul.

In that regard, scholar Max Boot has provided serviceable advice by using American adjustments in Iraq as a prime example of a system that could work in Afghanistan, though the latter has distinct challenges, which will need to be addressed.  Boot describes the major overhaul of the Iraqi prison system led by Major General Douglas Stone soon after the Abu Ghraib mess.  Stone…

“…segregated detainees based on threat level–the hard-core
jihadists were moved away from the small fry so they could not
influence them. Moderate Islamic leaders were brought in to preach
nonviolence and to counteract jihadist indoctrination. Panels of
officers were set up to review all detentions and arrange for release
of prisoners deemed no longer a threat. (Tribal elders or -others had
to vouch for their continued good conduct, which helps explain why the
recidivism rate has been extremely low.) For those still stuck behind
barbed wire, family visits were not only allowed but encouraged,
providing a morale boost and dispelling rumors of mistreatment.
First-rate medical care was offered–equivalent to that received by
U.S. troops. Educational and vocational programs were set up to keep
prisoners busy and to teach them skills they could use to get a job…”

For the most part, Boot argues that such a system could be instituted in Afghanistan.  Boot is not naïve and acknowledges that current Afghan state and US/NATO forces lack many features that are either necessary or extremely helpful in making this change possible.

Though Boot concentrates on NATO and US legal restrictions (for NATO forces are scared of their own Abu Ghraib catastrophe and US courts have partly ruled that some Bagram prison detainees may have habeas corpus rights), and he is right to give them their due attention, but the tremendous infrastructure problems in Afghanistan are what will really challenge an efficient prison system reform and build up.  Afghanistan lacks trained judges, lawyers, prison wardens, security staff, along with any real substantial institutions that have proven themselves for any real length of time.  Jails can be built quickly if one has the resources, but these other attributes take time.  Time itself is a resource that many in the West seem to be running low on.

Excuse me World, how are you feeling about the NATO presence in Afghanistan?  What are your thoughts about a possible return to rule by the Taliban?

While WorldPublicOpinion.org asked the world, well almost 65% of it (actually just a few thousand scattered people), to share their thoughts on such questions in a recent survey last April and the results are both interesting and discouraging (check the PDF, not just the intro article).  The questions centered on what citizens from various countries (US, Mexico, Kenya, Russia, Pakistan, China, Taiwan, Egypt, etc.) thought about the US/NATO presence in Afghanistan, basically did they approve of it or not.

The first question asked simply ‘do you approve/disapprove’ of the UN-backed resolution that allows NATO’s effort in Afghanistan was a straight dead heat, 44% approving, 45% disapproving.  The US, France, UK, India, Taiwan, Nigeria, etc. were in favor of the mission and Pakistan, Egypt, Palestine, Mexico, Turkey, China, etc. disapproving.  The 2nd question was similar, asking whether or not one thought the NATO mission should be continued, but had a more one-sided result.  50% stated that the mission should be ended, while only 37% argued that it should continue.  While only India, US, and Kenya showed over 60% support for continuing the effort, only 13-14% of polled Pakistanis, Chinese, and Russians agreed.  Germany, a NATO member with troops in Afghanistan, had a 52% rate supporting withdrawal, a bad sign.

The next question asks the polled to put themselves into the Afghanis postion, and asking them what they believe the Afghan people want, for the NATO troops to stay or go home.  This brought similar results as the last question, 53% believing that the Afghanis want NATO out and only 30% stating that they believe the locals want them to stay.  Notably, only 9% of Pakistanis polled thought Afghanis wanted NATO to stay, this of course coincides with their own position on the issue.  Judging by rhetoric coming from President Karzai during the last year and from Presidential hopeful Abdullah Abdullah’s recent speeches, Afghanis are definitely tiring of the foreign presence on their soil, but just last January a majority polled that they want the US/NATO to stay.

The last question and its results was the most disturbing for me:  ‘If the Taliban were to regain power in Afghanistan do you think this would be very good, somewhat
good, somewhat bad or very bad?’  21% of those polled thought the return of the Taliban to power was either ’somewhat’ or ‘very’ good.  I know there are geopolitical reasons (Pakistan) and ideological (Egypt) for some to desire a return of the Taliban, but this is still an appalling large number to me.  The Taliban were one of the most brutal authoritarian governments that ever existed and they sheltered internationally dangerous criminals, their return to power is unacceptable.  4% of Americans thought the return of the Taliban to be ’somewhat good’, who are these people?

An interesting trend could also be seen in the poll’s results, though most Muslim-dominated countries (besides Azerbaijan) were siding against NATO/US policies or presence in Afghanistan, Iraq was for the most part, on the side of NATO/US.  For a country that seems more than tired with a US presence of their own, 43%, compared to 35% against, favored a US/NATO presence in Afghanistan.  The US may have a strategic ally in the heart of the Middle East afterall.

Polls like these are always deeply flawed and must be taken with about a dozen or so caveats, but nevertheless they do provide a small picture of how the world sees the Afghanistan conflict and the presence of the US/NATO in the country.

Here are three Afghan-related pieces I read recently that I want to comment on:

1. MountainRunner.us, Tom Broun

Tom Broun, a US military officer assigned to NATO, discusses the implications of the ongoing ‘Why Afghanistan Matters’ contest being hosted on Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube on a guest post for Mountainrunner.us.  Broun analyzes the media coverage of the Afghanistan war in NATO countries and is critical of its lack of attention until recently.  Here he states that…

a number of the involved publics concerned have been relatively insulated by their governments on the true nature of the conflict in Afghanistan.  While they’ve been told that life can go on as normal, or that their militaries are involved in some sort of humanitarian mission, or that there’s a war going on, media reports about casualties keep rolling in.  Some ask what they’ve gotten their troops into.  I believe a lack of discussion on the entire issue is most responsible for the steady downward trend in public support in a number of countries.  Meanwhile, however, the insurgents have a free voice in telling their side of the story.  Frankly, there is a vacuum in the media landscape, and the video contest and other initiatives are a recognition that we don’t need to cede that ground to the insurgents.

Broun is correct in acknowledging the usefulness and possibilities for engagement that this contest and its chosen mediums could bring.  The contest engages the general public and can bring people to feel closer to the efforts being made by our soldiers fighting thousands of miles away.  It also provides a venue for people to hopefully constructively voice their criticisms about the mission.

2. Democracy Arsenal, Michael Cohen

In this blogpost, Mr. Cohen rips apart NYTimes columnist Thomas Friedman’s recent editorial which takes a moralistic view that the US needs to help Afghanistan for humanitarian reasons, and using a story about little girls to make his point.  Cohen derides this type of reasoning, believing it hypocritical (since there are needy children all around the world, including here in America) and weak logic for why the US should maintain the fight.

Though, I indeed sympathize with Cohen’s realist logic, I feel that Friedman must be defended.  Just like Paul Berman articulated in his brilliant ‘Terror and Liberalism‘, the freedoms and universal rights of all Afghans, especially women and children, are worth fighting for and indeed are a serious aspect as to why the US remains in the country.  Though being led strictly on moral and liberal influences will get one in trouble in international relations, a measured dose has been useful in successfully spreading such ideals for the last several decades.  An Afghanistan with any bright future will be one were women have greater individual rights and all have a greater opportunities to succeed.  Bringing morals into warfare and politics is a dangerous game, but the US/NATO are on the right side in this fight and they should not be ashamed to proclaim this aloud (for instance on Youtube or Twitter).

3. Foreign Policy, Stephen Walt

Speaking of realists, Mr. Walt has a somewhat provocative take on recent report that the Obama administration is planning on reworking the Afghan prison system.  Like a good IR realist, Walt is legitimately concerned that this is yet another sign of ‘mission creep’ and does not really focus on what the real mission of the Afghan war is…making sure Al Qaeda and like-minded groups can’t attack the US homeland or interests.  While, I basically agree with Walt’s assessment that this new prison plan is indeed ‘mission creep’, I have to believe that it is an inevitable action considering the surge of troops and their latest moves into Taliban-controlled territories.  I mean where are you going to put the newly captured, which there will surely be hundreds if not thousands?  There is also the serious issue of separating the hardened terrorists and militants from the more everyday criminals.

One last point about Walt’s piece:  He states…’we bungled the subsequent reconstruction effort by going into Iraq, thereby enabling the Taliban to make a comeback.’  This careless, simple, anti-Bush administration remark is just thrown in as a fact.  Surely the Bush administration failed in many ways to stop the return of the Taliban, and there is no doubt Iraq was the central aspect of their foreign policy, but this does not fully account for the Taliban’s resurgence and current day’s Afghanistan instability.  It is indeed probable that the US/NATO/Afghan government would be in a similar predicament if Saddam Hussein was still in power in Baghdad.  Comments like this from respected scholars like Walt are not helpful to the debate.

It becomes tougher and tougher to read my Afghanistan related news feeds as it is becoming filled with reports of NATO and American casualties:

• Britain, which lost 8 of its soldiers in just a few days, has been doing some of the toughest fighting trying to capture Taliban-controlled districts in Helmand Province.  Though there has been talk of these recent string of deaths causing distress and possible thoughts and calls for retreat, a new poll suggests that Britain is at the very least maintaing support for the war effort.  Though the margins are near 50-50 for those who ‘oppose’ and those who ’support’ the war effort there.
• It appears 6 Ukrainian NATO soldiers died when their helicopter went down on Tuesday.  Even sadder is that it has been reported that a young child was killed by the crashing copter.  According to icasualty.org, 43 foreign soldiers have been killed so far in July, and the previous record of high of 46 will surely be broken.
• Americans, who have joined the British forces in trying to take control in Helmand, have taken the greatest losses.  Just like in the beginning of the Iraq surge, many American soldiers are losing their lives during the opening of the Afghan surge.  Lance Cpl. Pedro A. Barbozaflores, 27, of Glendale, Calif., and Master Sgt. Jerome D. Hatfield, 36, of Axton, Va, are just two of the many who paid the ultimate sacrifice.

May all of these soldiers rest in peace.

History is important.  It shows us what was tried in the past and how well it succeeded or failed.  It is for this reason, I bring you Patrick Devenny’s (no relation) analysis of Captain Charles Trower’s, a British cavalry officer who attempted to corral Pashtuns for the British Empire, memoirs.  Trower was in charge of ‘Native Horse’, a contingent of British-commanded irregular cavalry largely populated with ethnic Pashtuns near the modern day Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Though Trower and the British military and government never fully were able to bring central governance and stability to the region they did have some successes.  Devenny highlights certain effective incentive laden policies implemented by Trower and the British, including: consultation with tribal leaders, targeted recruitment, the
promotion of local elites, and a pay scale that rewarded good conduct
and active participation.

Does the Obama administration’s new strategy now being led by Gen. McChrystal include some of these elements?  Well there has definitely been attempts to consult with local tribal leaders, and in this regard targeted recruitment of groups and leaders who can be picked off on the Kabul government’s side, but overall these qualities seem to be lacking.  Of course, these policies are much harder to effectively implement than to proscribe.

(Photo Source: SHAH MARAI/AFP/Getty Images)

In the past week, British soldiers fighting to takeover and hold Helmand Province from the Taliban have faced mounting casualties and it is no surprise that the folks back home are showing signs of being rattled.  The British military lost 10 soldiers in the past week alone and the nation’s total of men killed in action in Afghanistan has officially passed those killed in Iraq, 179 to 184.  The news of the losses, and photos like the one above, are causing British politicians to look for answers or people to blame and British civilians to question whether this sacrifice is worth the fight.

In many ways, the rise in casualties was to be expected as with the help of thousands of US troops, the British troops have been tasked with defeating the Taliban in their stronghold of Helmand, which borders Pakistan.  As Gordon Brown and British military leaders are emphasizing, this is a crucial fight that will indeed be bloody.  This has not stopped many in Britain, including the leader of the opposition Liberal Democratic Party MP Nick Clegg, from criticizing both the lack of sufficient troop equipment and the mission’s importance and chances of success.  The issue of armored vehicles, or the British’s lack there of, is an especially hot topic.

For me, as long as the main debate topic is about how well the troops are equipped, instead of the mission’s vitalness or probability of success, I think that the mission will have the political and public support needed to continue, but just like here in the US, time is not unlimited.  In November, a BBC poll conducted asked whether Britain ’should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within the next 12 months’, and of the 1,013 adults questioned, 68% said yes and 24% said they should stay.

This has been a trying week for the Brits to say the least, but the country seems to still have a strong will for the Afghanistan cause as this editorial from The Telegraph exemplifies:

The war in Afghanistan is being fought in the national interest, not for the benefit of any party. All three major parties need to come together to ensure that our soldiers have the support and leadership from the British state that they need and deserve. That they have not so far received it is the greatest scandal of the war.

(Photo: AFP:Getty Images)

"It's a deal, Barack! (For now at least)"

“We reaffirm our commitment to the goals of the common fight against the threats of terrorism, armed extremism, and illegal drug trafficking in Afghanistan.  We shall continue and develop our cooperation in the interest of enhancing the capabilities of the government of Afghanistan to accomplish key socioeconomic objectives, to raise living standards, and to ensure the security of its people.”

Joint Statement by President Obama and President Medvedev

In all the hoopla over the Obama-Medvedev-Putin Summit this past week, many may have missed the most concrete accomplishment of the meetings, Moscow’s permission for over 4,500 flights over Russian airspace for American military personnel and equipment headed to Afghanistan.  Though this agreement was mainly hashed out before the summit, it was given attention and made to appear part of a greater cooperative future between these two states regarding the situation in Afghanistan by the release of this joint statement.  This strategic agreement goes beyond discussions of ‘reset buttons’, the idea that power is not a ‘zero sum game’ (I think it still is Mr. Obama), and may in fact hold more geopolitical importance than the promised reductions in nuclear warheads by Washington and Moscow (does anyone really think this will cause other states to give up their nuclear aspirations?).  The Obama administration claims that these new overflight routes over Russian territory will save valuable time and an estimated $133 million dollars.  And many also hope that the agreement combined with the nice words of cooperation in the joint statement portend a growing partnership between the two former cold warriors regarding stabilizing Afghanistan.

However, it has long been claimed that the US and Russia share similar interests in Afghanistan, mainly the destruction of international terror networks and regional stability.  But this has never meant that there are still not conflicting interests and the lack of real cooperation between the two great powers the past 7 years has shown these quite clearly.  Russia has and will probably never accept a strong US military presence so close to its borders and ‘near abroad.’  Moscow considers Central Asia its backyard and holds dearly its gas and oil pipeline monopoly in the area.  A stable, US/Western controlled/backed Afghanistan and Pakistan may mean diversified pipeline routes for the CA states.

Russia’s actions in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan (Manas airbase) showcase an aggressive state that will follow its perceived interests, even if they are contrary to ‘cooperating’ in stabilizing Afghanistan.  The Obama administration needs to be prepared for a possible setback after this positive agreement, as Moscow has shown that deals like this can easily be reneged upon and even outright contradicted.  Nicklas Noring from the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute offers cautious advice regarding US-Russian relations in Afghanistan;

Until Russia displays a genuine concern for Afghanistan and does not undermine other channels supporting this mission, it cannot be considered a worthy partner for cooperation. The terms of this “cooperation” suggest nothing less than that the U.S. is being duped, with the success of Afghanistan at stake.

PS:  I would like to recommend you check out Afghanistan Conflict Monitor.  A great clearinghouse of news/stories regarding Afghanistan.  A very useful and well-run site.

Just a day after most US troops vacated Iraqi cities, signaling the beginning of the end of the American military presence in Iraq, American forces launched one of their largest offensive campaigns in Afghanistan.  Approximately 4,000 marines partnered with helicopters and armored convoys made a major push into the Taliban dominated Helmand Province yesterday in an attempt to clear the area of insurgents and Taliban rulers and to help bring in Afghan military forces and government to hold the region.  This was the first major move since the Obama administration’s troop increase and strategy had been put in place.

The mission, dubbed ‘Strike of the Sword’, seems to be aimed at taking control over a region dominated (See Map) by the Taliban and making it secure enough for the August Presidential election.  This offensive hopes to turn into a defensive mission if/when US troops are able to remove most insurgent elements.  Marine Corps Brig. Gen. Larry Nicholson stated; “Where we go we will stay, and where we stay, we will hold, build and work toward transition of all security responsibilities to Afghan forces.”

This is what all those new troops were for, right?  To disrupt, remove the insurgents and be followed by holding the area so the Afghan government could start to work for and with all its citizens.  However, this will not be easy.  First off, the Taliban have controlled this region for years now and in many ways it is close to their homebase, and this brings them many homefield advantages.  They will not give it up easily and will be persistent, that is for sure.  It will be interesting to see how the Pakistani military’s offensive in their northwest will effect this marine offensive.  Will the Taliban be pincered in a bit with less havens to flee to in Swat or NWFP?

Another difficulty facing the ‘Strike of the Sword’ is the ‘Will of the People’ as it has been reported that many Afghan civilians in Helmand are not exactly happy with the US presence.  Civilian casualties and a lack of results after years of warfare have left many Afghans in this region dubious to the idea that the Americans and the Kabul government could provide long term security, stability, and progress.  Though many of these people may dislike the Taliban at least they provided portions of the first two of those.