These are heady days for both Afghan and American citizens.  Ballots continue to be counted and contested in Afghanistan’s 2nd presidential election, with Karzai in the lead, but not quite with the 50% he needs, and with Americans hearing in Gen. McChrystal’s recent assessment, a likely future request for more US troops and resources.  How both of these situations flesh out will do much in deciding the next few years and decades of the people of Afghanistan and the American presence in the region.

Focusing on the American military and strategic presence, there has definitely been much negative, or shall we say ‘pessimistic’,  attention given to the current situation.  A relatively diverse group has started to push harder for a pull back of American troops and resources in the Central Asian state and all trends point to a future where these only get louder.  Though I very much look forward to discussing these groups and this anti-Afghan War trend as a congruent movement, or trend, today I would like to focus on just two people’s view: Scholar Anthony H. Cordesman and Senator Russ Feingold.

These two men do not advocate the same strategy for America in Afghanistan, but both share the view that the war could be lost in the very  near future.  Their views are valuable examples personifying the struggles in which the Obama administration faces in this fight for Afghanistan and against Al Qaeda.  In fact, Senator Feingold believes the ‘fighting for Afghanistan’ part is in itself misguided.  In this piece he just wrote for the Wall Street Journal, Feingold pushes for a more focused, minimized strategy for the region that targets Al Qaeda, advocates stepping away from nation-building in Afghanistan, and warns against pushing Pakistan further to the brink of chaos.  Feingold argues that our Afghan troop presence is more of a detriment than an aid to overall US national security(though he doesn’t say exactly how), and pushes for a ‘flexible timetable’ for ending our military presence in Afghanistan.  Feingold makes clear that the US should not abandon the Afghan people or state, but that we should largely scale down our presence and introduce more modest goals.  Of course, there are many counter arguments to this policy prescription, with the most obvious to me being how will this guarantee that the Taliban or other Al Qaeda sympathetic group doesn’t gain power of a portion of the Afghan/Pakistan state (and see Joshua Foust’s series of ‘The Case for Afghanistan‘ for much more), but the point here is that I believe this strategy is finding more willing listeners than it did 8 years, 2 years, even 4 months back.

Respected scholar Anthony Cordesman, who recently did some excellent analysis of the US-Iraqi conflict, does not push for a withdrawal, but his view of conflict is nearly as dire as Feingold’s.  Cordesman, who was part of Gen. McChrystal’s assessment group, states that the US could ‘easily lose the war’ in the next three months without serious policy changes and concrete progress on the ground.  He acknowledges the growing unpopularity of the war in America and recent Taliban successes as two ways victory is falling from America’s grip.  Cordesman is critical of micromanagement from DC and advocates letting Gen. McChrystal and Ambassador Eikenberry have more control over both civil and military spheres.  In between the lines, Cordesman is basically calling for the Obama administration to give these men more resources and troops and less direction and orders.

This policy conclusion, though near the opposite of Feingold’s, comes from a similar assessment of the situation on the ground, and it is both of these strangely familiar views, that should cause President Obama great pause.  Though Feingold and Cordesman have different policy prescriptions for the present and future US presence in Central Asia, they both seem to agree that the war could be ‘lost’, if not already, then very soon.  As support for the war falls in the polls, groups start to mobilize against the war effort, scholars voice their dire assessments, and Congress members publicly push for withdrawal, the Obama administration finds itself more and more on the defensive.  As I have argued before, Obama will need to start using his political capital and bully pulpit to keep the country close to his own view, that is that this a ‘war of necessity’.  With a call for more troops likely only just days or weeks away, Obama will have to do this sooner than I, and likely he, ever thought.

Claims of fraud and victory have ringed throughout Afghanistan and in the international media since the first ballot was cast last week.  Though the presidential election was deemed successful, yet far from perfect, by European and American officials, many feel that the election was too riddled with fraud to be considered legitimate.  And though Karzai and Abdullah have both proclaimed victory, we are still far from knowing an official winner.  So where exactly do we stand?

In terms of determining a winner, there is a bit more clarity than in figuring out the extent of voter fraud.  The latest partial tally of votes shows incumbent Karzai with a slight lead over the main challenger Abdullah Abdullah, who has already claimed victory himself and been asked to concede by others.  The way things are looking right now with 10% of the votes counted show that Abdullah really has a shot of at least forcing a runoff (a candidate needs over 50% to win outright).  It appears Karzai has won 40% of the vote with Abdullah barely behind at 38%, close indeed.  Complete, unofficial results are likely to be announced in two weeks, with the vote being certified around Sept. 17 after the commission completes investigating fraud allegations.

Judging the extent of corruption in the election is a much harder task.  Jim Michaels of USA Today has a solid run down of the magnitude of official fraud claims and Martine van Bijlert at Foreign Policy shows examples of fraud from down on the ground (in the dirt?).  According to Michaels, about 225 complaints have been filed with Afghanistan’s Electoral Complaints Commission, including 35 serious enough to sway the results if confirmed, by Sunday.  An election official stated that they expect the number of complaints to reach the thousands.  Though this sounds bad, and yes it is bad, the 2005 Provincial elections saw 1,500 complaints.  Though this shouldn’t assauge any real fears or protest calls from those who feel they’ve been robbed (mainly Abdullah’s supporters), there is hope that the totality of these accusations does not put the legality of the election’s final results.

US envoy Richard Holbrooke voiced a similar sentiment: “We have disputed elections in the United States. There may be some questions here. That wouldn’t surprise me at all. I expect it, but let’s not get out ahead of the situation.”  Though his comparison with American elections is laughable, I respect his efforts at bringing stability and caution to the process. From an American/international perspective, one has to be careful to push for transparency and legitimacy in the voting and counting process, while also not to appear to be meddling too much or allow things to get too out of hand for fear that civil unrest could turn into violent unrest.  This is a thin line.

While it wasn’t perfect, as no one predicted it would be, but for the most part the Afghan presidential election went relatively well.  Of course, we should hold off full judgment until all the votes are collected, counted, and the election commission is allowed to check fraud complaints.  There have been some vote tallies, but it will likely take days, if not weeks, to get all the far flung votes accounted for and patience will be needed.  Reports have the death toll around 24-26 and no doubt countless others were too intimidated to cast their ballots or show their support to their preferred candidate.

Here are some sites that have had some valuable and continuous election day coverage:

At War - The New York Times latest updates on all things ‘Afghan election’.  Lots of great links, including work done by Dexter Filkins in the volatile south of the country.

Alive in Afghanistan - This is a fantastic new site just brought to my attention by a colleague which takes a stresses Web 2.0 applications (Facebook, Twitter) to spread transparency about events and ‘incidents’ inside of Afghanistan.

The Af-Pak Channel - The Foreign Policy site continues to have many articles and a constantly updated blog about the elections.

Afghanistan Conflict Monitor - A site I depend on for update news stories in Afghanistan.  Don’t take its name to literally as it covers many other Afghan related topics, i.e. local politics, culture..

Lastly, NPR has a great photo slide show about you guessed it, the presidential election.

Today was an important day in Afghan history and will likely help shape the futures of all Afghan citizens and for many Americans, but tomorrow, and the next day, the next day, (you get the point), will be just as crucial.

In a matter of hours many of those eligible to vote in Afghanistan, but not all unfortunately, will go to the polls and choose who they want to govern them for the next half decade.  This election has been fraught with peril and questions for months now and in many ways it’s hard to believe its here.  Though, just like after our own extended presidential election of 2008, I’m sure many Afghans are relieved it’s finally over.  There are many possible scenarios and election results, and just as many Westerners to prognosticate about them, that could occur, but only time will tell.  Will Karzai win without a runoff?  Will Abdullah, Ghani, Bashardost, etc. lead the way to a second round?  How much will election day violence affect the outcome, and more specifically, how legitimate the election results appear to be?  Will Afghanistan’s post-election fate be anything like its neighbor Iran’s?  We shall see.

A young Afghan girl watching Karzai in a presidential debate (I love this picture)

The one word surrounding this whole historical event is ‘cautious’.  As in the people of Afghanistan, the United States, the international community needs to be ‘cautious’ about the prospects for a successful election day and the results that spring forth from it.  Tomorrow, there will be violence.  There will be ethnic tension and votes based on these lines.  There will be Taliban thugs intimidating Afghan citizens.  There will be citizens voting for a candidate they don’t like very much.  There will be many citizens who feel that the outcome is already decided by either corrupt Afghan politicians or by American imperialists.  There will rigging and voter fraud.

But tomorrow, there will also be thousands of Afghans voting for the first time.  There will be millions more voting in their first modern day election, with for the most part, free and fair debate and competition.  There will be a chance that the Afghan state will have a government that most, though far from all, see as a legitimate governor of their society.  There will be neighboring Azeris, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turks, Persians, who will see nearby fellow humans having a voice in how their ruled.  There will be millions of women voting for their future when less than a decade ago the mere thought of such a thing was unfathomable.

So tomorrow will be eventful for the Afghan people and for those of us in America closely paying attention.  An Afghan businessman claimed: “This election is just one more step in building our democracy. The elections next year will be better.”  He is right.  I like his optimism, as ‘next year’ will be better.  I hope he’s right, because for much Afghanistan’s modern existence there have been many tomorrow’s that were not better than their today’s.

Good luck brave people of Afghanistan and to the Americans and foreigners protecting them.  Tomorrow will be challenging and bring new challenges, but a chance for democracy and good governance are worth it.

Abdullah Abdullah supporters supporting Abdullah Abdullah

These are trying, heady times in Afghanistan.  We are nearly on the eve of the nation’s second presidential election since the overthrow of the Taliban and much is at stake.  The Afghan government has ordered a halt to reports of violence, the Taliban have made sure there has been violence to report, and the candidates are finishing up their electioneering.  And I’m now gonna talk….geopolitics?  I spent a decent amount of time preparing this so I’m still gonna let it fly, or post, whatever.  I’ll be back tomorrow and election day with coverage.  Until then…

The triangular relationship between the United States-Iran-Afghanistan has been under analyzed for such a strategically important three-way.  Afghanistan and Iran are neighbors, each with major security issues, and the United States is obviously strategically and physically involved in Afghanistan and we all know the 30 odd years feud between Iran and the US, with Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and regional dominance putting further strains on the relationship.  These three states’ interests overlap and conflict to varying degrees and they need to be explored.

It is too often assumed that Iran and United States share only congruent interests in the Afghanistan conflict.  It is true that Tehran and Washington both desire a stable Afghan state, prevention of the return of the Taliban to power, the elimination of the drug trafficking, and the defeat of Al Qaeda and the two sides have worked together, mainly behind the scenes, toward promoting these goals, but conflicts of interests persist.  As much as Iran, and Russia as well for that matter, desires a stable Afghan state, Tehran desperately would like to avoid a Kabul government implicitly or explicitly allied with the United States.  Tehran would like a pliable Afghan state that it could exploit and as long as the United States is physically and diplomatically tied to Afghanistan, this cannot happen.  Therefore, one should not be surprised to read reports that Iranian elements are aiding certain insurgent groups, including the Taliban, inside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

US intelligence agencies have officially stated that Iran has ‘covertly supplied arms to Afghan insurgents while publicly posing as supportive of the Afghan government’.  The report released by the office of US Director of National Intelligence also stated that ‘Iran’s policy calculation in Afghanistan currently emphasizes lethal support to the Taliban, even though revelation of this activity could threaten its future relationship with the Afghan government and its historic allies within Afghanistan.’  There have been past reports that asserted that the government in Tehran was supplying weapons to certain Afghan insurgent groups as well.  We must also remember that this is the intelligence that the US deems releasable and that the real extent of Iran’s activity in Afghanistan is unknown.

The reasons for Iran’s covert help to the Afghan insurgency are no doubt complex and can probably never be fully known, but I feel the main reason has to be the disruption of the solidification of a strong, Pro-American Afghan state.  Iran is already hard at work fomenting a Shia-dominated Iraq that will at worst be a non-threat to Iran’s western border and at best a patron and gateway into Middle Eastern dominance.  And therefore we should assume they are trying for a similar outcome in Afghanistan, with the gateway toward Central Asia, Pakistan, and China instead of course.

Another factor that needs to be addressed in this geopolitical three-way is the presence of Iran’s nuclear program.  For the United States’ Obama administration the Afghan conflict and Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons are two of its key foreign policy challenges and surprisingly they are connected in various ways.  Scholar Marc Lynch (a big Obama supporter) laments the lack of such strategic analysis and discussion by academics and Obama administration officials on this key intertwining issue.  After listening to a presentation by Obama’s Afghanistan policy team, led by envoy Richard Holbrooke, Lynch found much wanting.  He raised these ‘crucial strategic’ questions as ones yet to be addressed by the US Afghan team:

How is Holbrooke’s team coordinating with the administration’s Iran policy makers (presumably but not transparently led by Dennis Ross)?  How will the administration assess the tradeoffs between pressuring Iran on the nuclear issue and seeking its assistance in Afghanistan, as both issues come to a head over the coming months?  Which will give if a choice must be made?  Obama’s foreign policy has always been characterized by a strong recognition of the inter-related nature of the various regional challenges — so how do the parts here, in these two vital theaters, fit together?

Great questions for which the answers will be hard to come by; for me and the Obama administration.  Nevertheless, these are questions that need to be thought through and answered as quickly as possible.  In terms of the question regarding tradeoffs between the American Afghan policy and its pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear weapons’ program, I have to believe the Obama administration will attempt to keep these as separate as possible, and don’t myself see this specific connection having a major impact, that is I don’t see any concessions the US could give to Tehran in terms of its position in Afghanistan that would cause them to give up their pursuit of nukes.  Lynch’s last question, regarding the interconnection of various regional challenges with Afghan-Iran-US at the forefront, is the most general, but most needed, as I stated in the beginning, this geopolitical triangular relationship needs more exploration and attention.

(Photo Source: NYTimes)

Afghanistan continues to find its way onto American news cycles and like most news, it’s of the bad and bloody variety.  The US military is on the verge of releasing its latest strategic review of the conflict and how the US expects to go forward, with the hottest topic (more troops?) being avoided.  The Taliban have announced and already put into practice an effort to disrupt the upcoming August 20 Presidential election and unfortunately their efforts have had some effective results.  Lastly, is the increasing uproar over a quietly passed law by the Afghan government that basically allows marital rape, among other restrictions on Afghan woman’s rights.   The passage of this despicable law shows just how complex this conflict is for the United States.  The Obama administration stated early on that its goals in Afghanistan were to defeat Al Qaeda and their partners in order to protect the US homeland and interests, but by its actions, and Bush’s, it is obvious that part of that policy includes creating a stable, democratic government in Afghanistan.  The fact that this government has illiberal elements that go against American values cannot be ignored, but what should/can the US do about it?

After all, the US/NATO is desperately working toward a successful and legitimate Afghan Presidential election in the face of a surging insurgency.  The US and nascent Afghan government need the winner to be seen as legitimate and strong.  Is this the time to raise a raucous over human/woman’s rights?  After a similar law came to pass in Afghanistan in April, President Obama condemned the policy and seemed to put some pressure on President Karzai, who quickly stated that he would review the legislation, but not much was ever changed.  As of knowledge right now, I have not heard a response to this latest woman’s right restriction from the Obama administration.

The dilemma remains and will most definitely continue for as long as the US has a strategic presence in Afghanistan:  How will it juggle its realist (defeat Al Qaeda, regional stability) interests with its liberal ideals (liberal democracy, human rights, woman’s rights)?  The way I see it is that the US (Obama administration) cannot ignore such egregiously illiberal policies from a government that it helped create and keep in power, but will have to treat the issue with a light hand.  In other words, the Obama administration cannot order the law to be repealed, threaten to redeploy its troops, or take away financial assistance.  It should publicly state its disapproval of the law, explaining why it sees the law as wrong.  In cases like these, the US should rock the boat gently, very gently, as this is one boat on immensely rough seas.

This is not a good position to be in, but when one has strategic interests in faraway lands with distinct histories, cultures, religions, societies, these are the positions you will find yourself facing.

While many, including myself, have advocated getting rid of the term ‘AfPak’, the Foreign Policy website has decided to take it full boar…devoting a whole page to ‘The Af-Pak Channel: Inside the War for South Asia‘.  Though I haven’t had a chance to dig deep into the site’s contents and intriciacies, one can quickly see right away that the editors are quite ambitious.  The site has feature articles, a blog (with a list of contributors longer than a good girls’ Christmas wish list), a daily brief, and two sections titled ‘Jihadistan’ and ‘Afghan Election Watch’.  Quick opinion: looks like a great place to come to for up-to-date Afghan-related information with a solid side of analysis for those looking for more.

Three important issues to cover, let’s go!

Ghani Gets a US Soapbox - Presidential hopeful Ashraf Ghani wrote a ‘why I should be President of Afghanistan and not Karzai’ piece in the Wall Street Journal this weekend and he comes out swinging.  Ghani argues that Karzai ‘turned’, not ‘helped’ or ‘let’, but ‘turned’ Afghanistan into ‘one of the world’s most failed and corrupt states.’  Though Karzai has indeed been guilty in the continued lack of progress of many social and governmental areas inside of Afghanistan, it is hard to ‘turn’ something that way when its largely already been so for quite awhile.  Ghani also discusses his reform plans for education, women’s rights, and block grants for the rural population.  I wonder if the Obama administration, which has been critical of Karzai, has attempted to increase American public exposure to Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the other major presidential candidate?

Dead, but Not Replacable? - One of the key leaders of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, is most likely dead, but what does this mean?  Joshua Foust at Registan.net tackles this problem and comes across pessimistic that it will have a serious impact on the Taliban’s current and future standing.  I’d like to think that a group does not have infinite leaders’-in-waiting and that this indeed could have a lasting impact, but as Foust rightly laments, it will be difficult to accurately quantify what this loss means to the Taliban and to the Afghanistan, Pakistan war.

WoT RIP? - Speaking of war, does the war on terror still exists and what does that mean for US efforts in Afghanistan?  President Obama’s main man on counterterrorism John Brennan made a major address last week laying out the administration’s policy on counterterrorism.  In the address, Brennan went out of his way to let everyone know that the term ‘war on terror’ was dead, but then went on the say this….’we are at war with al Qaeda, which attacked us on 9/11 and killed 3,000 people. We are at war with its violent extremist allies who seek to carry on al Qaeda’s murderous agenda. These are the terrorists we will destroy. These are the extremists we will defeat.’  I take this to mean that pretty much the policies and goals of the war on terror have stayed the same, but the names have changed.  I’m fine with the retirement of the WoT phrase, I just don’t think we need to act like we are starting a whole new strategy or fighting a different enemy, when both are basically the same as they were a few months ago.  Concerning Afghanistan, Brennan reiterated Obama’s pledge to bring stability to the country and referenced the Taliban as major opponents in this goal who will need to be defeated.

Lastly, I came across this threat assessment map of Afghanistan from Reuters.  The map visualizes for the viewer the already well-known fact that the country’s south and east are the most dangerous.

Questions? Comments?

When Iran’s presidential election turned into a full blown protest movement, I have to confess that my first regionally centered thoughts turned to Iraq, not Afghanistan.  I wondered if the relatively peaceful and successful provincial elections held in Iraq had had an effect on their nearby Iranian neighbors.  On the other side of Iran, of course, lies an Afghanistan in the midst of its own crucial presidential election.

The differences between Iran’s and Afghanistan’s presidential elections are just too numerous to go through, but there is one issue that we can delve deeper into, and that is the Afghan youth vote.  More specifically, should we expect young Afghan adults to be more engaged after seeing neighboring young Iranians take to the street?

Well, according to International Relations Lecturer at the American University in Kabul Oliver S. Mains, young Afghan adults are in no mood to get deeply involved.  Mains, mainly by using his own students as a field study on all Afghan young men and women, argues that his students are highly skeptical about US intentions in their home country and cynical about the abilities of their own government in Kabul, and that this has caused them to feel apathetic about the August 20th election.  He states that many of his students distrust the US presence in the country, believing that the US is just using Afghanistan for self-serving, strategic geopolitical reasons and using the Afghans as pawns.  Instead of believing that the US is there to bring freedom and progress they feel the US is holding them down, and with the lack of political and military progress since the 2001 invasion they have a lot to complain about.

Students at the Technology Education Center in Kabul

Mains argues that the students are apathetic about their own election because the ‘omnipotent’ United States is the only real power broker and controls everything that goes on in their country.  This mostly conspiracy thinking comes into harsh contrast to how Americans and the Obama administration view the situation.  In my opinion, most Americans feel that Afghanistan, specifically bringing stability and progress to it, is a great challenge, with many believing it is beyond our means to accomplish.  While President Obama’s new Afghan strategy has ramped up the American presence in the country, it has lowered expectations of a long-term US hold on the country and region, emphasizing that the US is battling to defeat Al Qaeda, not bring democracy to the region.

In any case, if one is to believe Mains’ depiction of Afghan young adults as disinterested and dispirited in regards to their country’s political present and future, then this is a serious problem.  How can good governance that is stable and productive take root in Afghanistan if the country’s youth are not involved or buying into it?  These young adults, especially those getting educated in universities, will be integral in the state’s future, whatever it may be, and they cannot be let to be another lost generation.

Though these young Afghan citizens have very good reasons to be pessimistic and distrustful, as their most of them have only known a violent, unstable society and governance, they will be needed if Afghanistan is going to have any type of positive future.  Fears of too great US control is not ridiculous thinking, but it is largely untrue.  The Obama administration has worked hard to appear impartial to the ongoing election and to promote transparency.  In fact, ever since the 2001 invasion the US has reiterated its desire for Afghans to rule Afghans, but judging by worries of Mains’ Afghan students this has fallen on some deaf ears.  The US must do a better job communicating our intentions and how difficult the process taken on by the US/NATO/Afghan government is to the Afghan people.  Afghans need to know that America is not ‘all-powerful’ and unfortunately has and will make mistakes, but they need to know that are intentions are good.

We want Afghanistan to be a stable, peaceful, open society as much as the Afghans do.  The young adults of Afghanistan need to know that their nation’s future is in their hands, not America’s.

It’s hard to believe, but the people of Afghanistan will go to the polls in just over three weeks to choose their next president.  Though the incumbent Hamid Karzai is the clear favorite, but his return to the state’s head office is not assured as challengers Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani have gone on the offensive, and there is a laundry list of issues, from corruption, to the rise in violence, to the lack of electricity for them to criticize Karzai’s leadership on.  There is a distinct possibility that Karzai will not obtain the 51% majority needed to avoid a runoff and this would open up the possibility that his rivals could all support one opposition candidate.

One specific issue concerning Karzai during the campaign that is especially disconcerting was his no-show at any presidential debates as of yet.  Afghanistan is a troubled, young democratic society and denying the Afghan people an opportunity to see political leaders express and argue their views of how they would run the country is unfortunate to say the least.  Debates are far from perfect venues for policy discussions, but they do require a certain sense of accountability from the politicians involved.

United States Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl W. Eikenberry appears to also be displeased with the lack of ‘debate’ so far in the Afghan election.  In a Monday op-ed in the Washington Post Eikenberry backhandly criticizes Karzai for his debate no-shows, stating the….’Afghan people deserve to know the platforms and implementation plans of each candidate.’  He goes on to list crucial questions that he believes should be being discussed during this election season:

“How will the next president finish building a strong army and police
force respected by the people and fully capable of providing security?
Can the nation’s wealth be used for investment and development in an
accountable manner? How will young people be educated and trained to
develop the human capital that Afghanistan needs to move forward? What
policies will be adopted to encourage the return to Afghan society of
those who renounce ties with international terrorism and the use of
force while accepting the constitution of the nation? What are the
candidates’ ideas for governing Afghanistan; how, for example, should
the provincial councils evolve to give a real voice to Afghans across
the land? And how can the international community better partner with
Afghanistan to achieve peace, justice and economic progress?”

A solid list, but I can think of some others: What should the relationship be between the federal government in Kabul with the provinces, and vice versa?  How will the new/continuing government bring electricity to the thousands of Afghans who lack the vital economic resource?  To each presidential candidate, Who are the insurgents that can be brought back legitimately into Afghan society and governance and who are the ones that cannot?  How do the candidates view the NATO/US force presence?  How do they view the working relationship between the Afghan and US government?  What role should women play in society and governance?  How can they foster better relations with their neighbors, specifically Pakistan, Iran, etc.?

What questions would you ask Karzai, Abdullah, Ghani, etc. if you moderated a presidential debate in Kabul?